1 In view of the increasingly serious "free-rider" problems among colleague students especially graduate students involving the tertiary education courses, this paper analyzes the behaviors of both teacher (principal) as well as student (agent) in incentive contract on the premise of information asymmetry. Subsequently, the paper intends to propose a student's achievement evaluation model based on information screening and methodologically employs the dynamic simulation so as to operate the digital simulation. The result reflects a mitigation of students' free-riding behaviors due to the information screening via incentive contract menu. Meanwhile the ratio of checking for routine performances is raised in order to maintain and improve the effect of information screening.
Introduction
With the deepening of the reform of teaching form and assessment in higher education, more and more courses of various major such as experimental design of some core compulsory courses are arranged in the laboratory or computer center room. Meanwhile special courses catering for academic paper and graduation thesis (design) guidance are carried out regularly as server students gather in teachers' office, studio or even teachers' own house.
Also for those fundamental courses (Advanced Mathematics etc.) and extra tuition of test-preparation (for instance: National Computer Test Band 2, College English Test 4 & 6 etc.), students are divided into groups and an extracurricular question answering form is adopted.
It is obvious that the old-fashioned assessment of final closed-books exam and ordinary roll call fail to meet the needs of the new style of teaching forms. Viewing from the teaching practice operated by various colleges and universities in recent years, many courses have raised the proportion of students' regular performance, ranging from 30% to 50%. At the same time, the closed-books final exam have been transformed into an open-ended final examination such as teamwork for professional experiment, system design, and writing the course paper.
In this way it can reduce the restraining caused by examination-oriented education system and improve the ability of students of actual practice as well as their enthusiasm for collaborative teamwork. Nevertheless, it may increase the arbitrariness of teachers as they assess each student's academic performance and inevitably encourage the "free-riding" problem.
The primary cause of "free-rider" problem, lies in the asymmetry of information between students and teachers. Hence, a set of incentive contract menu (menu of contract) designed for students needs to be established, namely it can conduct the information screening so as to identify different types of students to distinguish better behaved (or diligent) students between poor behaved (or lazy) ones with separation equilibrium. In the end, the former will improve (or at least keep the original) learn enthusiasm and achieve satisfactory marks and the latter shall get progress by getting rid of the "free-riding" behavior and instead studying hard.
Model Description
For the convenience of research and modeling, a hypothesis can be formulated that in class there are existing two types of students with diligence ) (H and sloth ) (L , and the achievement evaluation can only be described as high grade and low grade, then the probability of having a student with an H type is ρ ; the probability of L type is ρ -1 . To avoid the "free-riding" behavior of lazy students, this paper proposes a set of rules for student's performance evaluation so as to distinguish different types of students under the premise of asymmetric information and without the use of final paper examination.
Essentially, according to Myerson's display principle, the student performance evaluation rule is an incentive contract and it must comply with Incentive Compatible and Participation Compatible. There into the Participation Compatible ensures that the students' academic marks or earnings (the total score) is not less than the expected return (retained earnings) with no incentive. Incentive Compatible ensures that agents, namely students always make incentive decision which maximize their own earnings (marks). Unlike the general game model and incentive strategy, in this case, the information rent (the total score) paid by the principal namely the teacher is zero cost on the basis of information asymmetry between teachers and students.
It is assumed the students' general assessment score is composed of three parts: attendance, A Q & section, discussion and in-class communication, experiment (or design). That is i
,α , β , λ represent the weight of each part. The teacher needs to announce the performance evaluation rules to all the students before the course begins. The specific incentive contract terms are as follows: (1) For students' attendance, the total number is recorded as n ; whenever the teacher find you are late, absent, or leave class early, k point will be deducted each time. For example, a course has a total of 10 points, 10 point will be deduct when one of the above situation happens. (2) For the performance of students in A Q & part, the quality and level of the questions should be classified as: challenging questions; routinely questions; trivial questions and recorded in three point sections as 90-100, 80-89, 70-79 respectively. For those students who barely ask questions (in real situation they are the majority), only 60-69 points can be obtained. (3) For in-class discussion and the experimental (or course design) results, teachers need to carefully observe each group's discussion and communication and mark their performance according to the observation. In the case of limited time, the teacher can take a spot check randomly. For students' final submission of the experiment (or design), the power point presentation conducted by team leader and members should be added in order to clearly identify their contribution to the achievement and they can get 85-100, 70-84, 55-69 points accordingly. Of course, if the above achievement evaluation rules are to be successfully implemented, teachers need to spend multiple time and energy on supervising the course. In the model, one teacher's effort factor represents itself as ef and the greater the ef , the better the information screening effect will be and the smaller the probability which is ) | ( L H p of mistaking the lazy ( L type) students for diligence ( H type). It can be noted as
. Conclusively it can be understood that when teachers give 100% effort to screen information, the probability of students getting a "free ride" is zero; otherwise all the L type students reveal free-rider behaviors without any inspection.
3
. 3 . 3 . 3 .
Model simulation and numerical example analysis
Due to the information asymmetry between teachers and students and the dynamics and randomness of students' behavior during the course, this paper adopts Monte Carlo simulation method to simulate the classroom performance of students. The effect of the variation of parameters exerted on the performance evaluation of the model was measured by the mean value (expected value) of the results.
Assuming that
Suppose there are 50 students in a class, when 0.5 ρ = , then there are 25 H type students and 25 L type students. Excel software is used to write VBA program to simulate the whole process of information screening.
The chance of students getting a free ride is set as )
. If L type students get away smoothly, their attendance records are going to increase by a third, A Q & marks will be promoted to a higher level(10 points) and at the same time the results of in-class discussion or communication and experimental (or design) outcome will be upgraded(15 points). The simulation results are shown in Figure 1 . When the teacher's effort factor emerges as 0.4, 0.8 and 1 respectively, the total score of students decreased gradually. When 1 ef = , it is indicated the ideal state of the teacher's information screening and this is no chance of students getting free ride as the final total score reflects the true grades of them. The data in Table 1 shows that if the weight of the following three parts: attendance, A Q & parts, discussion and experiment (design) outcome which constituting the achievement evaluation vary, there will appear diverse effect of information screening although the teachers' efforts remain the same level.
From the data of the fourth column, when 0 ef = , which indicating there is no information screening (complete "free-riding" behavior), the greater the proportion of attendance and A Q & section, the lower the expected value (mean value) of a student's total score. It is shown that raising the weight of the students' average (daily) performance is conducive to ameliorating the problem of "free-riding". Meanwhile it could be told by the data in each row that as the teacher's information screening factor is raised from 0 to 0.5, the student's expected rating was reduced which in turn is consistent with the trend of the curve in figure 1 . The downward trend of the information screening rate in the last column can be clarified that the lesser the ratio of students' usual performance, the more serious the "free riding" problem and vice versa. 
Conclusion
With regard to the prevalent "free-riding" problem among college students, this paper analyzes the underlying reason of "free-rider "behavior: it is the asymmetry of information between teachers and students that enable lazy, poorly performing students to obtain high marks through information hiding and pretending. Through designing an incentive contract menu (students' performance evaluation rules) by teachers to identify distinct types of students, the model simulation data reveals that students shall never get a chance to free riding" when the teachers spare no efforts to information screening. At the same time, when the weight on students' usual performance shrinks, it is obvious to notice a preferable effect of relieving the "free-riding" phenomenon via information screening.
